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Abstract
This paper develops an efficiency theory of contingent trade policies. We model the
competition for a domestic market between one domestic and one foreign firm as a pricing
game under incomplete information about production costs. The cost distributions are
asymmetric because the foreign firm incurs a trade cost to serve the domestic market.
We show that the foreign firm prices more aggressively to overcome its cost disadvantage.
This creates the possibility of an inefficient allocation, justifying the use of contingent trade
policy on efficiency grounds. Despite an environment of asymmetric information, contingent
trade policy that seeks to maximize global welfare can be designed to avoid the potential
inefficiency. National governments, on the other hand, make excessive use of contingent
trade policy due to rent shifting motives. The expected inefficiency of national policy is
larger (smaller) for low (high) trade costs compared to the laissez-faire case. In general,
there is no clear ranking between the laissez-faire outcome and a contingent national trade
policy.
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1 Introduction
Contingent protection occupies an interesting niche within the trade policy literature; if certain
pre-specified criteria are met, as substantiated through a quasi-judicial process, then a country
feels entitled to impose a trade barrier. Classifying policies from this procedural perspective
implies that contingent protection covers a range of policies such as anti-dumping (AD), coun-
tervailing duties (CVD) and safeguards/escape clause actions. While the motivation and appli-
cation of these policies varies, the pre-determined criteria for their use lends an air of legitimacy
to their implementation.1 However, regardless of the apparent legitimacy afforded by an inqui-
sitional methodology, these policies tend to be criticized due to their excessive use which stems
from the malleable nature of the criteria employed. In short, while there may exist some criteria
which justify a policy intervention at a global level (i.e. some market failure), the inefficiencies
from having policy implementation at a national level tends to offset any potential benefits.2
However, it is not immediately obvious that tolerating a market failure is the better option.
Hence the objective of this paper is to distinguish the circumstances under which policy action
may potentially be effective from those when it will not.
To explore the issues associated with this question we construct a simple framework that
includes the potential for market failure and therefore scope for a policy response. The setting
we choose resembles a dumping style model. Our point of departure is to move the rationale
for policy intervention away from the usual motivation of predation toward a broader and more
relevant concept of allocative efficiency.3 Therefore we focus on the question of who should be
producing what and whether trade policy, in the form of duties, has a role to play in improving
1The original motivation for AD policy is based in the logic of predation, while CVD is motivated by “unfair”
foreign policies. In contrast, the use of safeguards has been justified on the basis of maintaining sufficient flexibility
to ensure the continued adherence to a trade agreement (see Bagwell and Staiger (1990)). Alternatively, contingent
trade policy can be regarded as the remains of a gradual reduction of trade barriers; see Chisik (2003) for model
of gradualism in free trade agreements.
2For instance AD duties are often seen as gratuitous in size — with duties of the order of 100% not unusual,
see Bown (2007).
3Our focus on price discrimination is reminiscent of Brander and Krugman (1983). However, while dumping
occurs in their framework, it is not the focus of their analysis. As discussed below, we adopt a market structure
that emphasizes the resource allocation issues and provides a clear policy benchmark.
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efficiency. If a policy-maker has complete information about the relevant costs, then determining
the optimal allocation of resources is straightforward and the only real concern is one of policy
failure. This is the element - policy failure - that the previous literature has focused on and sought
to stress. If the policy-maker is incompletely informed about the cost structure, then both the
mechanics of competition become more involved and the criteria for determining government
intervention becomes less transparent. In this setting it is possible to have a market failure that
cannot be adequately addressed by government intervention. It is this environment of asymmetric
information in which we couch our analysis.4
More specifically, we develop a model of international competition where neither firm is
reliably informed of the other’s cost structure.5 To sharpen the implications of competition,
we assume that firms produce a homogeneous product and compete in prices; generating a
winner-take-all scenario. Under complete information this set-up achieves allocative efficiency.
Allocative efficiency is also achieved under the assumption of symmetry when firms are incom-
pletely informed (that is, both firms are assumed to take cost draws from the same probability
distribution).6 The virtue of this set-up is that under either complete information or asymmetric
information there is no market failure and therefore no need for government intervention. This
provides us with a clear and unambiguous benchmark. However, as a model of international
competition it is lacking a critical feature: transport costs. The introduction of transport costs
implies that the firms are no longer symmetric. This small, but realistic change has potentially
important implications for the allocation of resources: the higher cost firm can ultimately be
the sole supplier in the market. This market failure has a clear source; since the foreign firm
is at a disadvantage due to transport costs it prices more aggressively than the domestic firm.
Consequently, when both firms have the same cost draws (inclusive of transport costs in case of
the foreign firm), the foreign firm will quote a strictly lower price. This implies two things. First,
4A policy process distorted by political influence can also result in government failure. In this paper we
abstract from this consideration and focus on the issue of whether or not a domestic government can intervene
in an efficiency enhancing manner.
5For empirical evidence of firms operating in a stochastic environment, see Hillberry and McCalman (2011).
6See Spulber (1995).
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in the neighborhood of these cost draws it is possible to identify outcomes where the higher
cost foreign firm serves the domestic market; an inefficient allocation of resources. Moreover,
this inefficiency can be very pronounced, representing up to 15% of ex ante surplus. Second, the
foreign firm prices more aggressively abroad than in their local market, i.e. dumping occurs.7
Given such market failure, the question we address in this paper is whether the use of con-
tingent trade policy can remedy the inefficiency and achieve an efficient allocation of resources.8
One important obstacle the policymaker faces is that production costs are private information.
Can a government infer which firm is the lower cost producer for any given set of cost draws
from the firms’ pricing behavior? And if the answer is positive, does the announcement of a
framework for intervention still enable such an inference to be drawn?9
We consider this problem from two perspectives, starting with the case of a global institution
seeking to maximize global welfare. We show that a global planner who announces a policy of
contingent intervention will indeed be able to infer the costs from the optimal pricing functions
in this new environment. In fact, the optimal pricing functions are symmetric over the sub-region
of common costs. So despite the difficulties associated with the cost draws being private informa-
tion, a global planner can design a policy of contingent intervention that will result in a first best
outcome. The second scenario is the case where it is up to national governments to implement
contingent trade policy. This is an important case to consider since historically national govern-
ment have designed and implemented the most frequently used contingent protection schemes
(e.g. AD). Once again we show that even though the pricing game is altered by the potential for
policy intervention, a national government can still infer the relevant costs to satisfy its policy
7Dumped imports are typically defined to be foreign products exported at prices below ”fair value,” that is,
either below the prices of comparable products for sale in the domestic market of the exporting country or below
costs of production.
8A number of other papers have considered an environment of asymmetric information: Miyagiwa and Ohno
(2007), Matschke and Schottner (2008) and Kolev and Prusa (2002). However, these papers are concerned with the
implications of AD policy on firm behavior (output, prices and profits) and do not investigate whether AD duties
can achieve a first best outcome. Martin and Vergote (2008) consider the role of asymmetric information over
government preferences in trade agreements and find retaliation is a necessary feature of any efficient equilibrium.
They suggest that AD policy could be interpreted as one potential manifestation of retaliation.
9Even in a complete information setting, Staiger and Wolak (1992) and Anderson (1992) make the point that
the mere existence of anti-dumping policy will alter firms behavior.
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objective. National policymakers, however, do not have any incentive to implement the global
first best outcome. Seeking to maximize national welfare, they exploit the rent shifting aspect
of protection and make excessive use of contingent trade policies. The resulting equilibrium will
thus again be inefficient from a global perspective, this time because of rent shifting.
The presence of two inefficiencies — one stemming from market failure, the other from a
purely national objective — obviously raises the question which of them is quantitatively more
important. Our analysis shows that the allocative inefficiency dominates at high trade costs.
For lower trade costs, on the other hand, it is the inefficiency caused by rent shifting motivated
policy that is larger. At high trade costs, it might be preferable to allow national governments
to conduct contingent trade policy, while for low trade costs the laissez-faire regime welfare-
dominates nationally conducted policy.
This paper is not the first paper on contingent trade policies, there is a large and extensive
theoretical and empirical literature on anti-dumping, countervailing duties and safeguards/escape
clauses (for an overview, see for example Chapter 7 in Feenstra (2004) and Blonigen and Prusa
(2003)). We regard our paper as complementary to a newer literature whose objective is to
explain the flexibility of trade agreements and the existence of contingent trade policies as a
response to potential shocks.10 Our paper characterizes the conditions under which contingent
trade policies are feasible (that is, can be “successfully ”implemented), and it offers a rationale
for why countries may have this discretion rather than be bound by a fixed policy. While this is
a similar emphasis to the flexibility literature, the innovation of our paper is that we allow for
an interplay between the policy environment and the actions of firms — that is, we allow the
announcement of the policy rule to change firm behavior. So rather than having a given degree
of uncertainty and choosing the optimal design of the institution under various constraints (e.g.
ability of adjudicators), we examine how the institutions themselves can either enhance or under-
10One strand of this literature considers contingent trade policies as an insurance against shocks which keeps
the trade agreement viable, see for example Fischer and Prusa (2003). Other papers have even endogenized the
scope of an agreement by explaining the contract incompleteness by costly contracting, see Horn and Staiger
(2010), Maggi and Staiger (2008) and Maggi and Staiger (2009). For a model with costly state-verification, see
Beshkar and Bond (2010).
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mine their own effectiveness. One paper that uses a similar framework to ours is the important
early contribution by McAfee and McMillan (1989) who analyze preferences for domestic firms
in public procurement auctions. While similar in motivation, they consider unconditional policy,
whereas the emphasis in this paper is on conditional policy.
Our type of conditionality of the intervention distinguishes our paper also from the strategic
trade literature under asymmetric information. This literature starts from the assumption that
the government knows less about market and/or cost conditions than firms do. For example, Cre-
ane and Miyagiwa (2008) discuss the conditions under which firms have an incentive to disclose
information to their local government. Qui (1994) shows that a government prefers to employ
a menu of policies which leads to revelation of private cost information when firms compete
by quantities but a uniform policy if they compete by prices. Maggi (1999) demonstrates that
allowing non-linear trade policy instruments when firms know more about market conditions
actually can make the equilibrium more inefficient compared to the case of complete informa-
tion. Similar to these papers, our model shares the feature that the government commits itself
(successfully) to an intervention. In strategic trade policy models, however, the treatment of each
firm depends only on what this firm has done, and not on what the other firm has done. In our
model, the announcement of a policy framework not only alters the behavior of both firms, but
also potentially alters the ability of the policy to be implemented; after all an intervention takes
place only if the government concludes that the “wrong” firm has won the market.
Our paper draws on the methods in auction theory but also moves beyond it in an important
way. While the laissez-faire case is strategically equivalent to an auction and can be solved in
the usual manner by looking for an Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the case of policy intervention
is more involved. In that case, we solve for a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, since both
firms and the regulator form mutual beliefs about their behavior, and more importantly, all act
upon these beliefs, which must be confirmed in equilibrium. This analysis goes beyond the usual
auction setup because actions are taken based on the outcome of the market game. We will show
that a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in which the regulator will learn the type of each
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firm and thus will be able to pursue the announced policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we set up the model, solve
for the price functions, and show that an allocative inefficiency can arise. Section 3 presents the
analysis of a contingent trade policy that maximizes global welfare. In Section 4, we analyze the
policy a national government seeking to maximize national welfare would enact, and compare it
to the laissez-faire case. Section 5, finally, offers concluding remarks.
2 The model
We begin our analysis by considering a baseline setup without contingent trade policy. A key
feature of the framework presented here, driven by informational asymmetries, will be the pos-
sibility of market failure (i.e. a misallocation of resources). Our setting features two firms — a
domestic firm and a foreign firm — which both produce a homogeneous product for the domestic
market. Consumers in this market have unit demands, a maximum willingness to pay of one, and
without further loss of generality, we normalize the size of the domestic market to one. Firms
compete against each other in prices; that is, consumers buy from firm i if pi < pj (and random-
ize in case of equal prices). In choosing a model of price competition in homogeneous goods with
inelastic demand, we squarely place the emphasis on the location of production as being the sole
determinant of economic efficiency. Whereas our motivation for choosing this setup is analytical
tractability, our choice also reflects key features of markets in which contingent protection is
applied most frequently. In particular, these are markets characterized by a high elasticity of
substitution, implying relatively homogeneous products. Comparing the value of the elasticity
of substitution for products involved in anti-dumping cases to those that are not, we find that
the former exhibit an elasticity of substitution that is on average 50% higher – consistent with
our homogeneous products setting.11
11To arrive at this figure, we use Chad Bown’s anti-dumping database (Bown (2007)) to identify the HS10 codes
for anti-dumping cases initiated in the US. Since the Broda-Weinstein estimates (Broda and Weinstein (2006)) of
the elasticity of substitution are also at the HS10 level, we can compare the mean elasticity of substitution across
products involved in anti-dumping cases and those that aren’t. There are approximately 800 HS10 codes that
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Importantly, we assume that the firms’ production costs, c1 and c2, are private information.
That is, a firm knows its own cost but does not know the cost realization of its rival. As is standard
in models such as ours, we assume that the beliefs of firm i about the production cost of its
opponent, cj, are described by a cdf , F (c). That is, costs are drawn from the same distribution.
Note that the asymmetry of information alone is not enough to generate a misallocation of
resources. To obtain a potential market failure, we rely on adding the plausible feature that the
foreign firm must pay a per unit trade cost of t (which is assumed to be common knowledge).
By adding the trade cost to the model, it now has a feature that potentially induces market
failure. At the same time, adding this feature complicates the analysis since it is possible for
the foreign firm to receive a cost draw that — once the transport cost is added — exceeds the
domestic consumer’s willingness to pay. In case of such a high cost, the foreign firm will clearly
not be competitive in the domestic market, and leave the market to the domestic firm. To deal
(or rather to avoid dealing) with this case, we add a pre-stage to our model where the foreign
firm has to decide whether to enter the domestic market. If it decides to do so, it has to pay a
market-entry cost of , which can be observed by the domestic firm. The investment required
to enter the market can be relatively small, for example the search cost of finding a wholesaler
and/or retailer. Importantly, the entry decision of the foreign firm signals a certain productivity
range, which allows the domestic firm to update its beliefs about its opponent’s productivity. If
the foreign firm does not enter the market, the domestic firm is a monopolist and will set p1 equal
to one. In what follows, we shall focus on cases in which entry occurs.12 Table 1 summarizes the
sequence of decisions in our model, which can be solved backwards in the usual fashion.
In order to solve for the equilibrium, we start from the premise (to be verified later) that
the optimal pricing functions pi(ci) are monotone and strictly increasing in costs. This implies
that there exist inverse pricing functions that are also monotone and strictly increasing in prices.
have been involved in US anti-dumping cases with a mean elasticity of substitution 18 for these products. This
is 50% higher than the mean elasticity of substitution for products not involved in anti-dumping cases (mean
elasticity is 12, in these 13,000 other products).
12The other case is trivial and not of particular interest. We should keep in mind, though, that our analysis is
conditional on entry, and that a change in t also changes the probability of entry.
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Table 1: Game structure
Stage 0:
In case of a contingent trade policy, the regulating authority
specifies its rule of intervention.
Stage I:
Both the domestic and the foreign firm draw
their marginal production costs from [0, 1].
Productions costs are private information.
Stage II:
The foreign firm decides on entry which warrants
a cost of size ,  ≥ 0,
observable by the domestic firm.
Stage III:
If the foreign firm has entered, both firms set their prices.
If the foreign firm has not entered, the domestic firm sets its price.
Stage IV:
In case of a contingent trade policy, the regulating authority
observes prices and intervenes according to its rule.
We denote these inverse pricing functions by φi(pi), i.e. price pi is associated with a cost ci =
φi(pi). These costs are drawn from a common distribution, characterized by the cumulative
distribution function F (c). The trade cost and the entry decision of the foreign firm imply that
the (updated) beliefs over the other firm’s cost will be asymmetric across firms. Let F1(c1) denote
the distribution of the cost of the domestic firm, which is identical to the underlying distribution
F (c). The distribution of the cost of the foreign firm, F2(c2), on the other hand, is based on a
Bayesian update from F (c) in line with the observation that the foreign firm enters the market.
Consider now the firms’ pricing decisions. Suppose the domestic firm sets a price of p1, and
the foreign firm employs the inverse pricing function φ2(p2). The probability that the domestic
firm loses the market in the Bertrand pricing game is equal to F2(φ2(p1)), which captures the
probability that the foreign firm has a cost below the threshold value that is implied by applying
its inverse pricing function to the price p1. In this case, the domestic firm’s profit is zero as it
is undercut by the foreign firm. The domestic firm wins only if p1 < p2, that is, its chances of
winning are equal to 1 − F2(φ2(p1)). A similar argument applies to the foreign firm. Hence we
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can write the expected profits of both firms as follows:
pi1(p1; c1) = (1− F2(φ2(p1)))(p1 − c1), (1)
pi2(p2; c2) = (1− F1(φ1(p2)))(p2 − c2 − t), (2)
where the first term in each expression on the RHS is the probability of winning the market,
and the second factor is the profit margin. Note that the foreign firm has an extra cost of t to
deduct from its margin.
Each firm chooses its price in order to maximize expected profit. The resulting first-order
conditions for interior solutions are given by:
(1− F2(φ2(p1)))− f2(φ2(p1))φ′2(p1)(p1 − c1) = 0, (3)
(1− F1(φ1(p2)))− f1(φ1(p2))φ′1(p2)(p2 − c2 − t) = 0, (4)
where fi(ci) = F
′
i (ci) denotes the density function corresponding to Fi(ci).
In order to make the model tractable, we make the following two assumptions:
ASSUMPTION 1. Costs are distributed uniformly over the unit interval, i.e. F (c) = c.
Assumption 1 will allow us to find closed form solutions for the optimal pricing functions.
Furthermore, the update of beliefs is straightforward: Let γ denote the critical foreign type which
is indifferent between entry and no entry into the domestic market. If the domestic firm believes
that only the (productive) types will enter for which c2 ≤ γ, it follows that F2(c2) = c2/γ. Since
the most intense price competition will occur if the foreign can enter easily, we also assume the
following:
ASSUMPTION 2. The investment cost the foreign firm has to pay for entering the market is
very small, i.e.  ' 0.
Both assumptions enable us to determine the optimal pricing behavior for the laissez-faire
case without policy intervention:
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LEMMA 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and without policy intervention, F2(c2) equals c2/(1−t)
and firm 2 enters if c2 ≤ 1− t. Furthermore, in case of entry, the equilibrium pricing functions
are given by:
p1(c1) = 1−
√
1 + (1− c1)2K1 − 1
(1− c1)K1 (5)
p2(c2) = 1−
√
1 + (1− [c2 + t])2K2 − 1
(1− [c2 + t])K2 , (6)
where
K1 =
t(2− t)
(1− t)2 ≥ 0 and K2 = −K1 ≤ 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
Note that the solution includes the special case of symmetry when t = 0. In this case, both
pricing functions simplify and take the form:
pi(ci) =
1
2
+
ci
2
.
Returning to the case of a strictly positive trade cost, Figure 1 depicts an example of the
pricing functions derived above (where we have chosen t to equal 0.2). Note that the pricing
strategy of the foreign firm is depicted as a function of total cost, c2 + t, and is represented by
the lower of the two curves, the one that starts at t = 0.2. Now consider the following notion of
aggressiveness: A firm’s pricing strategy is more aggressive than that of its rival if it has the larger
overall cost (which includes t for the foreign firm) when charging the same price. Comparing the
two firms’ strategies, there is a clear result:
LEMMA 2. The foreign firm prices more aggressively than the domestic firm.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
The intuition for this result is that the foreign firm wants to make up for its inherent cost
disadvantage (caused by the trade cost t) in order to increase its probability of winning. Given the
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Figure 1: Equilibrium price functions for t = 0.2.
assumptions of unit demand and uniform cost distributions, which are made to obtain a tractable
solution, a question naturally arises about the robustness of this result. Krishna (2002) relaxes
the uniform distributional assumption and shows (Proposition 4.4, page 48) that the ’weak’
bidder whose value distribution is stochastically dominated (reverse hazard rate dominance) by
the distribution of the ’strong’ bidder bids more aggressively. Appendix A.1 provides a proof
along similar lines for our setup, where we additionally allow for elastic demand. That is, the
result that the weaker firm prices more aggressively persists even if the uniform distributional
assumption is relaxed and demand is price elastic.
One important consequence of the foreign firm’s aggressive pricing behavior is the possibility
that it offers the lower price even though it has the higher over-all cost. Hence this framework
has the potential to generate an inefficient allocation of resources. Note that it is not always the
case that the allocation is inefficient when the foreign firm offers the lower price. The inefficiency
only arises when the foreign firm offers the lower price and has the higher cost. Formally, the
outcome is inefficient whenever p2 < p1 and c2 + t > c1.
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Figure 2: Probability and Conditional Expected Loss under Laissez-faire
While the model admits the possibility of an inefficient outcome it is natural to consider the
likelihood of this result. Appendix A.1 shows that the probability of an inefficient trade is given
by:
prob =
1
2
+
1
(2− t) (1− t) −
1
1− t . (7)
Not surprisingly the likelihood of an inefficient outcome is a function of the size of the trade
cost. To examine this relationship more closely, differentiate with respect to the trade cost:
∂prob
∂t
=
t2 − 4t+ 2
2(t2 − 4t+ 4) (8)
This derivative is positive for low trade costs but becomes negative for higher t. The resulting
non-monotonicity of the probability of inefficiency is displayed in Figure 2, which also shows the
expected loss, conditional upon inefficient entry, which can rise up to a significant 15% of the ex
ante surplus.
Note that this also has the interesting interpretation that the phenomena of inefficiency in our
model is non-monotonic. That is, if trade costs are low, then a misallocation of resources is
unlikely to occur because the inefficiency disappears as t goes to zero. Similarly, if trade costs
are very high, then inefficiency is also unlikely to occur because the foreign firm is most likely
not competitive. However, as trade costs start to fall, the likelihood of an inefficient outcome
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increases. Regardless of the source of the trade costs (i.e. transport costs or artificial trade
barriers), the model poses a challenge for the policy maker: since the allocation of resources can
be inefficient, is it possible to use government policy to improve on the market outcome? Since
the market outcome is not always inefficient, the policy will necessarily be contingent.
An alternative and apparently simple solution to our problem seems to be that the regulator
could give the two firms the chance to revise their prices. If firms had revealed their costs in a
first round, second round Bertrand competition would lead to an efficient outcome. The problem
is, however, that the two firms have no incentive to do so. If, for example, the two firms can
freely revise their prices, their first-round price announcement would have no binding effect
whatsoever, and would thus also not be able to signal costs. This is also true if firms can revise
their announced prices only downwards as they do not lose anything by announcing a unity price
in the first place. Unless their price announcements are a costly commitment, they cannot serve
as signals. Matters get more complicated when the two firms compete repeatedly. Suppose that
the two firms compete over two periods and that their first period price signals would indicate
their costs, leading to Bertrand competition in the second period. If both firms had truthfully
signalled their costs, one firm would win the market by marginally underbidding the other firm’s
cost. But then each firm has an incentive to appear stronger in the first period than it actually is,
with the consequence that no separating equilibrium exists.13 Thus, revision options or repetition
does not solve the efficiency problem.
3 Globally Optimal Policy
Start by considering a globally efficient policy. Such a policy has the objective of avoiding the
inefficiency and ensuring that the lower cost firm serves the market. The global planner, however,
cannot directly observe the costs of the firms which are private information, she can only observe
13The non-existence of a separating equilibrium is due to the ratchet effect in sequential games of asymmetric
information. For the seminal paper in the dynamic context of procurement contracts with adverse selection and
moral hazard, see Laffont and Tirole (1988).
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the prices that they charge.
A characteristic of the pricing functions that we derived in the previous section is that they
are strictly monotone and therefore invertible. Consequently, a global planner can deduce from
the announced prices what each firm’s costs are, at least in a scenario without intervention.
Clearly, allowing the government to intervene changes the nature of the interaction, and may
lead to pricing functions that are no longer monotone. This section therefore has two goals: to
determine how the equilibrium pricing functions are altered if the global planner announces the
objective of allocating production to the lowest cost firm. And second, to check whether the new
pricing functions are indeed monotone, so that the policy-maker can deduce the information that
is required to implement the policy.
We start from the premise (to be verified later) that an equilibrium with strictly monotone
pricing functions exists if the global planner announces her intention to intervene in order to
allocate production to the lower cost firm. Note that the inefficiency in the (baseline) model
always involved the foreign firm because the domestic firm never offered the lower price when it
has the higher cost. This is not necessarily true anymore with policy intervention. Note further
that we do not need monotonicity across the entire range. In particular, for c1 ∈ [0, t], a single
domestic price is sufficient as the domestic firm has always lower cost in this range.
We now specify the candidate equilibrium in this setup. If one firm has the higher cost (inclu-
sive of trade costs in case of the foreign firm) but the lower price, suppose that the policymaker
can commit to intervene and allow the firm’s competitor to serve the market at price
p˜i = αci + (1− α)pi, (9)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We choose this linear combination in order to allow for a wide range of
possibilities: at one extreme, if α is chosen to be one, the government forces the firm that is
awarded the market to sell at cost, while for α = 0 the government allows the firm to charge its
original higher bid price. Clearly, the choice of α will influence the respective pricing behavior.
Eq. (9) is a shortcut for the negotiations between the government and the efficient firm that
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leads to agreement by which the government imposes the price. In our model, α determines the
split of aggregate welfare gains between consumers and the efficient firm.
Operating in an environment where trade policy is made contingent on the ranking of both
prices and costs complicates the form of the expected profit functions. Now, not only are profits
a function of prices (as was the case in eqn (1)), but also of contingent policy. To derive the
profit of each firm under this regime requires working through the implications of choosing a
price, conditional on the firm’s own costs, the belief on the other firms pricing function and also
the potential for policy intervention.
Let us start from the fact that each firm knows its own cost ci and treats the other firm’s
cost cj as a random variable with cumulative distribution function Fj. In this case, there are two
important reference points on the support of Fj. First, is the own cost ci, as this is the threshold
that prompts the global policymaker to act (i.e. if ci ≤ cj the policy maker will award the market
to firm i if it does not have the lower price). Second, just as before, the cost that its own price
implies on part of the other firm using the competitor’s inverse bid function, i.e. φj(pi), as this
is the threshold for winning the market outright without intervention.
To be more precise, assume first that one firm, say the domestic firm, follows an aggressive
pricing policy and sets a low price such that φ2(p1) + t < c1 (i.e. if the foreign firm were to set
a price of p1 it would be associated with a cost draw of c2 = φ2(p1), which implies a total cost
less than that of the domestic firm). In other words, if both firms charged the same price, it
would turn out that the foreign firm has the lower overall cost, and this would prompt a policy
intervention. Hence, in the case of an aggressive pricing strategy, the domestic firm can win only
if it has the lower cost, and this happens with probability 1− F2(c1 − t).14
Now suppose that the domestic firm prices less aggressively such that φ2(p1) + t > c1. In
that case, it will win outright if it charges the lower price which happens with probability
[1−F2(φ2(p1)]. In addition, if (c2 + t) ∈ [c1, φ2(p1)], the competitor wins, but is overruled by the
global policy maker who will give the market to the domestic firm at price p˜1. This will happen
14Similarly, if the foreign firm charges a low price such that φ1(p2) < c2 + t, it will win only if it has the lower
overall cost, that is, if c2 + t < c1 which happens with probability 1− F1(c2 + t).
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with probability [F2(φ2(p1))− F2(c1 − t)].15
Given own costs, beliefs on the rival’s pricing strategy and the form of contingent protection,
we can now determine the profit functions of both firms. The domestic firm’s expected profits
are equal to
pi1 =

[1− F2(c1 − t)](p1 − c1) if φ2(p1) + t < c1, (10a)
[1− F2(φ2(p1))](p1 − c1) +
[F2(φ2(p1))− F2(c1 − t)](p˜1 − c1)
if φ2(p1) + t ≥ c1 (10b)
and the foreign firm’s expected profits are equal to
pi2 =

[1− F1(c2 − t)](p2 − c2 − t) if φ1(p2) < c2 + t, (11a)
[1− F1(φ1(p2))](p2 − c2 − t)
+[F1(φ1(p2))− F1(c2 + t)](p˜2 − c2 − t)
if φ1(p2) ≥ c2 + t, (11b)
where p˜1, p˜2 are determined according to (9).
Intuitively, if a firm prices aggressively it will win outright whenever it has the lower cost.
On the other hand, for pi above a threshold, the probability of winning outright decreases in
its own price, whereas the probability of winning due to policy intervention depends positively
on the price, but the margin might be lower in that case, depending on the policy rule p˜. The
objective function is shown in Figure 3. Given the expected profit it is now possible to determine
the optimal pricing strategies. Differentiating equations (10a) and (10b) with respect to p1 yields
15Similarly, if the foreign firm prices less aggressively such that φ1(p2) > c2 + t, it wins straightaway with
probability [1 − F1(φ1(p2)] and will win the market for the price p˜2 due to policy intervention with probability
[F1(φ1(p2))− F1(c2 + t)].
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Figure 3: Profit function under contingent protection
(similar expressions hold for the foreign firm):
∂pi1
∂p1
=

[1− F2(c1 − t)] if φ2(p1) + t < c1, (12a)
[1− F2(φ2(p1))]− f2φ′2(p1 − p˜1)
+(1− α)(F2(φ2(p1))− F2(c1 − t)).
if φ2(p1) + t ≥ c1 (12b)
Expression (12a) shows that the marginal profit is constant for φ2(p1) + t < c1, and hence
expected profits increase until φ2(p1) + t = c1. At φ2(p1) + t = c1, the profit curve has a
downward kink, but it is not clear a priori whether (12b) is positive or negative at this point.
If it is positive, profits increase further, and we find the optimal price by setting (12b) equal to
zero. If not, φ2(p1) + t = c1 gives the maximum as profits decline beyond that point.
To gain insight into the role of contingent protection in determining the optimal pricing
strategy, consider the extreme where α = 0. In this case, the regulating authority allows the
efficient firm to charge the price it had posted, i.e. p˜1 = p1. The first-order condition then
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becomes linear everywhere:
∂pi1
∂p1
= 1− F2(c1 − t) ∀p1. (13)
This induces each firm to charge the maximum price of one because it knows that the chance
of winning only depends on the cost realization. In this case, the price solely determines the
profit margin if the firm happens to have the lower cost. However, all types choose this pricing
policy, and hence the regulating authority cannot learn anything about the firm’s type. Except
for α = 0, we have the following clear result:
PROPOSITION 1. If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and the government intervenes according to
(9) with α ∈ (0, 1] in case of inefficiency, a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in which
F2(c2) = c2/(1− t), that is, firm 2 enters if c2 ≤ 1− t. In case of entry, the equilibrium pricing
functions are given by
p1(c1) =

1 + αt
1 + α
if c1 ∈ [0, t],
1 + αc1
1 + α
if c1 ∈ [t, 1],
p2(c2) =
1 + α(c2 + t)
1 + α
if c2 ∈ [0, 1− t]
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 1 shows that both firms use symmetric pricing functions across the common range
of overall costs.16 While it may be tempting to think that an equilibrium with symmetric pricing
functions involves both firms charging lower prices, this is incorrect in general. For example, the
pricing functions are equal to p1 = (1 + c1)/2 and p2 = (1 + c2 + t)/2 for the common support of
16As in the case of no intervention, these results do not rely on the assumption of a uniform distribution.
The appendix shows that similar conclusion can be reached under the assumption that costs are distributed
exponentially. However, the pricing functions in this case cannot be represented by a closed form solution.
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overall costs if α = 1. Furthermore, both (1+αc1)/(1+α) and (1+α(c2+t))/(1+α) increase with
α. The reason for this is that a high α gives more weight on the marginal cost and less weight
on the posted price for the case of intervention (see (9)). It therefore becomes less attractive to
win because of intervention and the posted prices go up so as to compensate for the decrease in
expected profit after potential intervention.
These pricing functions allow us to answer the two questions posed at the beginning of the
section. Given that the two firms follow the same pricing policy over the set of common costs,
inefficiency is no longer an equilibrium outcome. Consequently, the policy is effective in achieving
its objective of a first best outcome. As for the question whether the policymaker can still infer
the costs, note that the above pricing functions are strictly increasing where the supports overlap,
and the domestic one is constant at the lower end. That is, the policymaker can infer which firm
has the lower cost and hence the policy is feasible.
A further observation is that while global welfare is maximized by this policy, there are
potentially distributional implications. In particular, the home country will have a lower expected
welfare in some cases. For example, as α→ 0, both firms employ very flat pricing functions that
approach 1. In this case, whenever the foreign firm has lower costs, the home country receives
approximately zero welfare. As t→ 0, this occurs approximately half of the time. Under laissez-
faire, the domestic country gets positive consumer surplus for almost all cost draws and half
of the time also earns domestic profits. Consequently, the home country is not always better
off under a global contingent trade policy. While the potentially asymmetric distribution of the
costs and benefits under a global policy might suggest that the home country could be reluctant
to endorse a global policy, this interpretation relies too heavily on the single sector setting.
Adding a second sector, where the home country is an exporter, then creates an environment
with greater symmetry that allows the potential costs and benefits to be offset. Nevertheless the
distributional implication are an intriguing feature of the model.
Notice that any negative cross-country distributional issues arise partly as a function of α,
which potentially makes a case to restrict the size of α. However, this isn’t the only argument
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that can be made for restricting the value of α used in the policy rule. In particular, the global
planner’s indifference towards α is due to the simplifying assumption of inelastic demand. In
the extreme case of α = 0, i.e. the domestic firm gets to charge its asking price in case of
policy intervention, both firms set a price of 1. At the other extreme, if α = 1, the firms set the
same (lower) price as in the symmetric laissez-faire case. The global planner is indifferent only
if demand is inelastic, as she cares solely about who supplies the market, not at what price. If
demand is elastic, by contrast, there is an additional consumer surplus consideration, and the
global planner will prefer the lower price that results from a higher α.
4 Nationally Optimal Policy
The previous section shows that placing contingent protection under global discipline has the
virtue of ensuring a first best outcome. However, historically the most prominent contingent
protection instruments (AD, CVD) have been designed and implemented at the national level.
This shift of fora has a number of implications including the fact that national governments
have the objective of maximizing national welfare, not global welfare. In contrast to the globally
optimal policy, national governments do not only seek to correct the potential inefficiency, they
also pursue rent shifting motives because they value the domestic firm’s profit but not the foreign
competitor’s. Consequently, they intervene earlier and the foreign firm will be allowed to serve
the domestic market only if its price is below the domestic firm’s cost, because only in that
case does the gain to domestic consumers dominate the profit loss of the domestic firm. If the
foreign price lies between the domestic cost and the domestic price, on the other hand, then a
prohibitive import tariff is imposed, and the domestic firm is allowed to set a price equal to (9).
The objective of the domestic government to maximize national welfare suggests that there is
likely to be a divergence from the efficient outcomes of the globally optimal benchmark. The
interesting question then is whether or not the domestic policy mitigates or exaggerates the
inefficiencies associated with market failure.
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To answer this question we must, once again, address the same two issues as in the previous
section: How does the announcement of such a policy influence the equilibrium pricing functions?
And can the policy be successfully implemented? As before, we start from the premise (to be
verified later) that the pricing functions are monotonically increasing so that observing the bids
allows the government to infer the respective costs.17
Provided that the foreign firm only gets to serve the market if its price is below the domestic
firm’s cost, the foreign firm’s expected profit takes the following simple form:
pi2(p2; c2) = [1− F1(p2)](p2 − c2 − t) (14)
Note that the foreign firm’s expected profit is independent of p1, and therefore independent of
the domestic firm’s pricing behavior. Therefore the foreign firm’s profit maximization problem
can be solved independently of the domestic firm’s pricing behavior.
LEMMA 3. If a foreign firm for which c2 ∈ [0, 1− t] enters and a national government inter-
venes according to (9) as to maximize domestic welfare, the foreign firm’s pricing and inverse
pricing functions are respectively given by
p2(c2) =
1 + c2 + t
2
and φ2(p2) + t = 2p2 − 1. (15)
Proof: For an interior solution, the first order condition is given by
∂pi2
∂p2
= [1− F1(p2)]− f1(p2)(p2 − φ2(p2)− t) = 0 (16)
which implies the following inverse bid function
φ2(p2) + t = p2 − 1− F1(p2)
f1(p2)
. (17)
17Note that in this case only the domestic pricing function needs to be monotonically increasing since the
foreign price and not cost turns out to be the conditioning variable.
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Assumption 1 implies (15).
We now turn our attention to the domestic firm’s behavior. Given the foreign firm’s strategy,
the domestic firm’s profit function takes the following form:
pi1 =

p1 − c1 if p1 ≤ (1 + t)/2, (18a)
[1− F2(φ2(p1))](p1 − c1) +
[F2(φ2(p1))− F2(φ2(c1))](p˜1 − c1)
otherwise (18b)
where p˜1 (see (9)) is the price that the government allows the domestic company to charge in
case of policy intervention, as before. As long as the domestic firm charges a price below the
lowest foreign price, that is p1 ≤ p2(c2 = 0) = (1 + t)/2, it wins the market for sure, which leads
to profits of p1 − c1. If the domestic price lies above the threshold, there is a probability that it
wins the market outright, represented by the first line of (18b), or it may win due to national
policy intervention, which is reflected by the second line of (18b). We now derive the domestic
firm’s optimal pricing strategy resulting from the above profit function.
PROPOSITION 2. If the national government maximizes national welfare and intervenes
according to (9) with
α ∈
(
1
2
,
1
1 + t
]
a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in which a foreign firm for which c2 ∈ [0, 1− t] enters
and the domestic firm’s pricing function is given by
p1(c1) = c1 +
1− c1
2α
. (19)
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
Note that there is a tighter restriction on α compared to the globally optimal policy. First,
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given foreign pricing behavior, the domestic firm can win for sure if it charges (1 + t)/2. This is
unprofitable only if the price p˜1 imposed by the authority is not too close to the cost but leaves
a substantially large profit. This is the reason for the upper bound on α. Second, if α were small,
the domestic firm would receive a profit close to its posted price in case of intervention. Since the
domestic firm loses only if its cost is above its rival’s price, it would go for the maximum price
of unity for low values of α, and not only for α = 0 as in the case of globally optimal policies.
This is the reason for the lower bound on α.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
t
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
probability
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
t
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
L
Figure 4: Comparison of Probabilities and Expected Losses
What are the consequences of a nationally conducted contingent trade policy? Given our focus
on allocative efficiency, we use this as the appropriate benchmark. In the case of a nationally
optimal policy, there is again the possibility of an inefficiency, that is, the higher cost firm ends
up serving the market. However, it will not be a higher cost foreign firm that serves the market.
Instead the national policy favors the domestic firm to the extent that it might end up serving
the market despite having the higher cost. That is, the market failure that we identified in
the laissez-faire scenario is replaced by a (globally) inefficient allocation brought about by the
national government, only that the inefficiency now goes in the opposite direction.
To gain some insight into the likelihood of this scenario, Appendix A.3 shows that the proba-
bility of an inefficient outcome is given by (1−t)2/4. This enables us to compare the probabilities
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of the inefficient outcomes in the laissez-faire equilibrium (see the dashed lines in Figure 4’s left
panel) and for the nationally optimal policies (see the solid lines in Figure 4’s left panel) re-
spectively. In the right panel, Λ is the difference in the unconditional expected loss between the
nationally optimal policies and the laissez-faire equilibrium. As can be seen from the diagram,
there is no unambiguous ranking of these policies.
In contrast to the laissez-faire outcome, the likelihood of the domestic policy inducing an
inefficient allocation is monotonic — the inefficiency probability being much larger (lower) for
low (high) levels of t. The reason is that the nationally optimal policy will call for intervention
also when trade costs are low, provided the foreign price (not foreign overall cost) exceeds the
domestic cost. In this case, intervention happens mostly for rent shifting motives, as the likelihood
of an allocative inefficiency under laissez-faire is low. For higher trade costs, on the other hand,
the foreign firm charges a higher price, and thus its probability of winning is low. The national
government thus is rarely prompted to intervene. This is in contrast to the laissez-faire regime
in which the foreign firm prices more aggressively. Therefore, the nationally optimal policy has
a lower inefficiency probability for high trade costs.
Comparison to the laissez-faire case reveals that the nationally conducted contingent trade
policy dominates for high trade costs, while laissez-faire is welfare superior (in expectation) for
lower trade costs. Abstracting from other aspects, one could thus argue that nationally conducted
AD policy, to take one example, might have some merit when trade costs are high. Once trade
costs decrease with globalization, however, there comes a point when not allowing such nationally
conducted policies would actually be preferable.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has developed an efficiency theory of contingent trade policy. We show that there is a
case for policy intervention if firms compete in prices under incomplete information. The reason
is that, in the absence of intervention, the foreign firm prices more aggressively, and therefore
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might end up serving the market in spite of having the higher overall cost. In case of a globally
optimal policy, inefficiency does not occur as both firms employ the same pricing strategy across
the common range of overall costs. Hence the policymaker does not actually have to intervene, the
threat of intervention alone leads to allocative efficiency. In case of a nationally optimal policy,
driven by rent shifting motives, it is the domestic firm that can be the source of inefficiency, and
inefficiency is likely to occur for low trade costs in contrast to the laissez-faire outcome. This
observation strengthens the need for global policy coordination of contingent trade policies as
markets become ever more integrated.
Global policy coordination of contingent trade policy, however, is not yet part of multilateral
trade agreements. Until now, such policies are mostly a national matter, except perhaps for
countries within the European Union. The need for global policy coordination in view of deeper
integration raises the question whether the existing trade agreements should continue to allow
such contingent trade policies in the first place. Should future trade agreements not rather give
the option of intervention to supranational authorities, instead of individual countries? Or at a
minimum provide greater discipline on them.
Failing an ability to include contingent protection within multilateral agreements, these poli-
cies are under national control. This leaves us with the question of whether policy options such
as anti-dumping, safeguards, and countervailing duties may become increasingly susceptible to
national interests. Our paper has shown that the likelihood of inefficiency, when these policies
are carried out by national governments, increases as trade costs decline. Yet this is exactly the
setting where contingent protection has the weakest justification.
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Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium pricing strategies without policy intervention
In case of entry, denote γ, γ ∈ [0, 1 − t] as the critical foreign type which is indifferent between
entry and no entry. We will determine γ below. Given that the domestic firm knows the size of 
and observes this investment, it will update its beliefs if it observes entry such that the foreign
types which enter will be uniformly distributed between 0 and γ. Consequently, the expected
profits of both firms are equal to
pi1(p1; c1) =
(
1− φ2(p1)
γ
)
(p1 − c1), (A.1)
pi2(p2; c2) = (1− φ1(p2))(p2 − c2 − t).
First, let us establish that both firms will employ a price strategy such that the optimal price
functions have a common upper and lower bound for those prices by which each firm is able to
win demand. Let the lower (upper) bound be denoted by p(p). If pi = p, firm i will win with
certainty, so there is no reason to undercut this price. This confirms the common lower price
bound, and hence φ1(0) = φ2(0) = p. Suppose that the first-order conditions (3) are fulfilled for
all pi ∈ [p, p]. We will now establish that
p =
1 + t+ γ
2
, (A.2)
φ1(p) =
1 + t+ γ
2
, φ2(p) = γ
φ1(p1) = c1, ∀p1 ∈ [p, 1]
are part of the equilibrium pricing strategies. Note that (A.2) specifies that the domestic
firm charges its cost for all prices above p; in these cases, the domestic firm cannot win the
market and will be beaten by the foreign firm with probability one. As we have assumed that
the first-order conditions hold up to p, we have to prove that no firm is better off by charging
a higher price. As for the domestic firm, pi1(p; p) = 0 because it will win with zero probability.
A higher price leads also to zero profits as it does not change the zero win probability; hence,
the domestic firm has no incentive to deviate from this strategy. The foreign firm is supposed
to charge p for c2 = γ. Given that the domestic firm charges its cost for all prices above p, the
foreign firm profit is equal to
pi2(p; γ) = (1− p)(p− γ − t) = (1− t− γ)
2
4
(A.3)
if it follows the prescribed strategy and
pi2(p2 > p; γ) = (1− p2)(p2 − γ − t)
if it charges a higher price. Maximizing pi2(p2 > p; γ) over p2 leads to an optimal p2 = p, and
hence also the foreign firm has no incentive to deviate.
For all p1, p2 ∈ [p, p], the first-order conditions for (A.1) are
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γ − φ2(p1)− φ′2(p1)(p1 − c1) = 0,
1− φ1(p2)− φ′1(p2)(p2 − c2 − t) = 0.
Note that each first-order condition depends on both inverse price functions. We now follow
a solution concept similar to Krishna (2002) as to determine the boundary conditions and to
simplify the differential equations. In equilibrium, ci = φi(pi), and using p as the argument in
the inverse price functions allows us to rewrite the first-order condition as
(φ′1(p)− 1)(p− φ2(p)− t) = 1− φ1(p)− p+ φ2(p) + t,
(φ′2(p)− 1)(p− φ2(p)) = γ − φ2(p)− p+ φ1(p).
Adding up yields
−d
dp
(p− φ1(p))(p− φ2(p)− t) = 1 + t+ γ − 2p, (A.4)
and integration implies
(p− φ1(p))(p− φ2(p)− t) = p2 − (1 + t+ γ)p+K, (A.5)
where K denotes the integration constant. We can determine K by using the upper boundary
condition. For p = p, the LHS of (A.5) is zero and we find that
K =
(1 + t+ γ)2
4
,
so that (A.5) reads
(p− φ1(p))(p− φ2(p)− t) = p2 − (1 + t+ γ)p+ (1 + t+ γ)
2
4
(A.6)
in equilibrium. Furthermore, φ1(0) = φ2(0) = p so that
p(p− t) = p2 − (1 + t+ γ)p+ (1 + t+ γ)
2
4
which leads to
p =
(1 + t+ γ)2
4(1 + γ)
. (A.7)
We can use (A.6) as to rewrite the first-order conditions such that each depends on a single
inverse price function only:
γ − φ2(p) = φ′2(p)
p2 − (1 + t+ γ)p+ (1+t+γ)2
4
p− φ2(p)− t = 0, (A.8)
1− φ1(p) = φ′1(p)
p2 − (1 + t+ γ)p+ (1+t+γ)2
4
p− φ1(p) = 0.
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Eqs. (A.2), (A.7) and (A.8) completely describe the equilibrium behavior of both firms in
terms of their inverse price functions.18 Hence, they represent the solution to stage II of our
game, given that no intervention will occur. As for stage I, eq. (A.3) allows us to determine the
critical type γ which will be indifferent between entry and no entry. This type’s expected profit
must be equal to the investment  such that
γ = 1− t− 2√.
An interior solution requires that 2
√
 < 1− t. More importantly, as we deal with markets to
which entry is easy, γ ' 1− t for a  sufficiently close to zero. For γ ' 1− t, (A.8) simplifies to
1− t− φ2(p) = φ′2(p)
(1− p)2
p− φ2(p)− t , (A.9)
1− φ1(p) = φ′1(p)
(1− p)2
p− φ1(p) .
Because prices must not fall short of overall costs, φ′1, φ
′
2 > 0, and hence the solutions to (A.9)
satisfy that the (inverse) price functions increase with the costs (prices). Solving these equations
gives the inverse price functions
φ1(p) = 1− 2(1− p)
1− (1− p)2K1 (A.10)
φ2(p) = 1− 2(1− p)
1− (1− p)2K2 − t, (A.11)
where the Ki’s are the constants of integration. Note that the domestic firm’s price policy will
no longer include a range of prices in which it will charge its cost (and win with zero probability)
because
p = 1 and p =
1
2− t
for γ ' 1− t. Using the last condition, that is φ1(0) = φ2(0) = 1/(2− t), we find that
K1 =
t(2− t)
(1− t)2 ≥ 0 and K2 = −K1 ≤ 0.
Plugging K1 and K2 back into (A.10) and solving for p yields (5).
To determine the probability that an inefficient outcome occurs, contingent upon entry of
the foreign firm, we define the borderline c˜2(c1) between the inefficient and the efficient set of
cost draws at which the resulting prices are equal. Setting p1 and p2 in (5) equal to each other
gives
c˜2(c1) = 1− 1− c1√
1− (2− t) t (2− c1) c1
(1− t)2
− t. (A.12)
18It is possible to derive explicit solutions for the inverse price functions. These functions, however, cannot be
inverted as to solve for the price functions. The results are available upon request.
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The foreign firm prices more aggressively if c˜2(c1) + t ≤ c1 which is equivalent to
(1− c1)
1− 1− c1√1− (2− t) t (2− c1) c1
(1− t)2
 ≥ 0
⇔
√
1− (2− t) t (2− c1) c1
(1− t)2 ≥ 1
⇔ 1− (2− t)t(2− c1)c1 ≥ (1− t)2. (A.13)
Note that the LHS decreases with c1 and is thus at least equal to 1 − 2t + t2 = (1 − t)2 or
larger which completes the proof for Lemma 2.
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Figure 5: Inefficiency in the laissez-faire equilibrium
The probability of inefficiency can be best derived from two graphs in the c2 − c1−space.
Figure 5 shows equation (A.12) for t = 0.2 as the solid line. The broken line is the efficiency
border c2 = c1 − t where both firms are equally efficient. For c1 < t, the domestic firm is the
efficient one in any case. In the laissez-faire equilibrium, the foreign firm wins (loses) if c˜2 < (>)c1,
and the domestic firm should win from a global perspective if c2 > c1− t. The area between the
two lines represents the inefficiency. Note that the size of the rectangle is 1− t due to the upper
bound for c2. The probability of inefficiency can thus be computed as the area below the solid
line minus the area below the broken line, corrected by the factor 1/(1− t):
1
1− t
(∫ 1
0
c˜2(c1)dc1 −
∫ 1
t
(c1 − t)dc1
)
=
1
2
+
1
(2− t)(1− t) −
1
1− t . (A.14)
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Proof for general distribution and demand functions
We now show — adapting the proof of proposition 4.4 in Krishna (2002) — that this result is
robust when relaxing the uniform distributional assumption and allowing demand to be price
elastic. Let x(p) be any downward sloping differentiable demand function with x(1) = 0. The
expected profit functions of the domestic and foreign firm then take the following form:
pi1(p1) = (1− F2(φ2(p1)))(p1 − c1)x(p1),
pi2(p2) = (1− F1(φ1(p2)))(p2 − (c2 + t))x(p2);
and the corresponding first order conditions of profit maximization are:
φ′2(p1) =
1− F2(φ2(p1))
f2(φ2(p1))
x(p1) + (p1 − c1)x′(p1)
(p1 − c1)x(p1) ,
φ′1(p2) =
1− F1(φ1(p2))
f1(φ1(p2))
x(p2) + (p2 − (c2 + t))x′(p2)
(p2 − (c2 + t))x(p2) .
We want to establish that the foreign firm sets a lower price if it has the same (total) cost, i.e.
p2(c) < p1(c)∀c ∈ [t, 1]. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose there exists a common
point; that is, for some p˜ ∈ (p, 1) φ1(p˜) = φ2(p˜) + t = z. Then the first order conditions above
imply:
φ′2(p˜) =
1− F2(z − t)
f2(z − t)
x(p˜) + (p˜− z)x′(p˜)
(p˜− z)x(p˜)
φ′1(p˜) =
1− F1(z)
f1(z)
x(p˜) + (p˜− z)x′(p˜)
(p˜− z)x(p˜)
where F incl2 is the foreign firm’s cost distribution defined in terms of total cost, i.e. F
incl
2 (c) ≡
F2(c−t). Assume that F incl2 stochastically dominates F1 = F in terms of hazard rate (not reverse
hazard rate) dominance. A linearly decreasing density as implied by F = 2c− c2 is one example
that gives rise to such dominance. Stochastic dominance together with the above derivatives of
the inverse pricing functions implies that p′1(z) > p
′
2(c) at any common point. This implies that
there is at most one intersection. Therefore if p1(c) were less than p2(c) for some c ∈ (t, 1), then
— no matter whether there is an intersection or not — this would imply that p2(c) > p1(c) at
c = t+ . However, we know that p1(0) = p2(t) and hence p1(t) > p2(t) which is a contradiction.
A.2 Globally optimal contingent trade policies
Following the discussion in the paper the objective functions are:
pi1 =

[1− F2(c1 − t)](p1 − c1) if φ2(p1) + t < c1,
[1− F2(φ2(p1))](p1 − c1) +
[F2(φ2(p1))− F2(c1 − t)](p˜1 − c1)
if φ2(p1) + t ≥ c1
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Figure 6: Pricing functions
and the foreign firm’s expected profits are equal to
pi2 =

[1− F1(c2 + t)](p2 − c2 − t) if φ1(p2) < c2 + t,
[1− F1(φ1(p2))](p2 − c2 − t)
+[F1(φ1(p2))− F1(c2 + t)](p˜2 − c2 − t)
if φ1(p2) ≥ c2 + t
where p˜1 = αc1 + (1 − α)p1, p˜2 = α(c2 + t) + (1 − α)p2. Using these definitions, the objective
functions can be simplified to:
pi1 =

[1− F2(c1 − t)](p1 − c1) if φ2(p1) + t < c1,
[1− αF2(φ2(p1)) + (1− α)F2(c1 − t)](p1 − c1) if φ2(p1) + t ≥ c1
pi2 =

[1− F1(c2 + t)](p2 − c2 − t) if φ1(p2) < c2 + t,
[1− αF1(φ1(p2)) + (1− α)F1(c2 + t)](p2 − c2 − t) if φ1(p2) ≥ c2 + t
Now adopt the assumption of a uniform distribution for c ∈ [0, 1], i.e. F (c) = c and f(c) = 1.
Since the foreign firm only serves the market if it receives a sufficiently low cost draw, we can
derive the updated distribution function for the foreign firm as: F2(c) =
c
1−t for c ∈ [0, 1− t] and
f2(c) =
1
1−t .
pi1 =

[1− t− (c1 − t)](p1 − c1)
(1− t) if φ2(p1) + t < c1,
[1− t− αφ2(p1) + (1− α)(c1 − t)](p1 − c1)
(1− t) if φ2(p1) + t ≥ c1
pi2 =

[1− (c2 + t)](p2 − c2 − t) if φ1(p2) < c2 + t,
[1− α(φ1(p2)) + (1− α)(c2 + t)](p2 − c2 − t) if φ1(p2) ≥ c2 + t
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First order conditions give:
∂pi1
∂p1
=

[1− t− (c1 − t)] > 0 if φ2(p1) + t < c1,
[1− t− αφ2(p1) + (1− α)(c1 − t)]− αφ′2(p1)(p1 − c1) if φ2(p1) + t ≥ c1
∂pi2
∂p2
=

[1− (c2 + t)] > 0 if φ1(p2) < c2 + t,
[1− α(φ1(p2)) + (1− α)(c2 + t)]− αφ′1(p2)(p2 − (c2 + t)) if φ1(p2) ≥ c2 + t
Note that in equilibrium it must be the case that φ2(p1) + t ≥ c1 (the domestic firm prices less
aggressively than foreign) and φ1(p2) ≥ c2 + t (the foreign firm prices less aggressively than
domestic). However, the domestic firm cannot price strictly less aggressively than the foreign
firm at the same time that the foreign firm is pricing strictly less aggressively than the domestic
firm. That is for c1 ∈ [t, 1] and c2 ∈ [0, 1 − t] the firms pursue a symmetric pricing strategy in
equilibrium. This implies φ(p) = φ1(p) = φ2(p) + t. These conditions imply that the relevant
part of the first order condition is the same for both firms:
[1− φ(p)]− αφ′(p)(p− φ(p)) = 0 (A.23)
Solving this differential equation and using the boundary condition that a cost of 1 implies a
price of 1 gives:
p1(c1) =

1 + αt
1 + α
if c1 ∈ [0, t],
1 + αc1
1 + α
if c1 ∈ [t, 1]
p2(c2) =
1 + α(c2 + t)
1 + α
if c2 ∈ [0, 1− t] (A.24)
To verify the symmetry of the pricing functions over the common support of total costs, con-
sider the objective function of the domestic firm under the conjecture that φ2(p) =
p(1+α)−1−αt
α
.
pi1 =

[1− t− (c1 − t)](p1 − c1)
(1− t) if φ2(p1) + t < c1,
[2− p(1 + α)− c1(1− α)](p1 − c1)
(1− t) if φ2(p1) + t ≥ c1
∂pi1
∂p1
=

[1− t− (c1 − t)] > 0 if φ2(p1) + t < c1,
2− p1(1 + α)− c1(1− α)− (1 + α)(p1 − c1) if φ2(p1) + t ≥ c1
Setting this last equation to zero and solving for p1 verifies that a symmetric pricing strategy
is a best response for a common total cost. A similar exercise can be conducted for the foreign
firm.
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While providing a characterization for general distribution functions is complicated by the
inability to find analytical solutions to the pricing functions, we can demonstrate that the sym-
metric pricing property evident above is not solely driven by the assumption of a uniform dis-
tribution. Instead of a uniform distribution assume that costs are drawn from an exponential
distribution F (c) = 1−e
−c
1−e−1 for c ∈ [0, 1] and f(c) = e
−c
1−e−1 . Since the foreign firm also has to pay a
transport cost, the updated distribution for the foreign is F2(c) =
1−e−c2
1−e−(1−t) and f2(c2) =
e−c2
1−e−(1−t)
for c2 ∈ [0, 1− t].
pi1 =

[1− 1− e
−(c1−t)
1− e−(1−t) ](p1 − c1) if φ2(p1) + t < c1,
[1− α
(
1− e−(φ2(p1)−t)
1− e−(1−t)
)
+ (1− α)
(
1− e−(c1−t)
1− e−(1−t)
)
](p1 − c1) if φ2(p1) + t ≥ c1
pi2 =

[1− e
−(c2+t)
1− e−1 ](p2 − c2 − t) if φ1(p2) < c2 + t,
[1− α
(
1− e−(φ1(p2))
1− e−1
)
+ (1− α)
(
1− e−(c2+t)
1− e−1
)
](p2 − c2 − t) if φ1(p2) ≥ c2 + t
First order conditions give:
∂pi1
∂p1
= [1− 1− e
−(c1−t)
1− e−(1−t) ] > 0 if φ2(p1) + t < c1,
= [1− α
(
1− e−(φ2(p1)−t)
1− e−(1−t)
)
+ (1− α)
(
1− e−(c1−t)
1− e−(1−t)
)
]
− α
(
e−(φ2(p1)−t)
1− e−(1−t)
)
φ′2(p1)(p1 − c1) if φ2(p1) + t ≥ c1
∂pi2
∂p2
= [1− e
−(c2+t)
1− e−1 ] > 0 if φ1(p2) < c2 + t
= [1− α
(
1− e−φ1(p2)
1− e−1
)
+ (1− α)
(
1− e−(c2+t)
1− e−1
)
]
− α
(
e−φ1(p2)
1− e−1
)
φ′1(p2)(p2 − (c2 + t)) if φ1(p2) ≥ c2 + t
Suppose both firms adopt a symmetric pricing strategy (φ1(p) = φ2(p) + t = φ(p)) for common
total costs (c1 = c2 + t = c˜), then the relevant part of the above first order conditions have a
common form and evaluated at the optimum can be written as:(
1− αe−(1−φ(p)) + (1− α)e−(1−c˜))− αφ′(p)(p− c˜) = 0 (A.29)
While this equation doesn’t have a closed form solution, it does share the property that the
equilibrium pricing functions will be symmetric for common total costs.
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A.3 Nationally optimal contingent trade policies
Below the lowest price of the foreign firm, the domestic firm’s profit function is strictly increasing
in p1. This implies that the domestic firm will never set a price below (1+t)/2 but instead charge
(1 + t)/2 which leads to profits of pˆi1 = (1 + t)/2− c1.
Above the threshold, the first order condition for (18b) leads to (19). Note that this function
is monotonically increasing as long as α > 1/2. For α = 1/2 the domestic firm charges a price
of one, independent of its cost draw. For a lower α, that is, when the government allows the
domestic firm to charge a relatively high price in case of intervention, the first order condition
would imply a decreasing price above unity, but given our assumption that the willingness to
pay is bounded at one, it charges a price of one for all α ≤ 1/2.
For α > 1/2 we need to check that the profit resulting from the above pricing rule exceeds
the profit pˆi1 that the firm would obtain by charging the lowest price of the foreign competitor.
Plugging (19) back into (18b) results in the following condition:
pi∗1 =
(1− c)2
2(1− t)α ≥ pˆi1 =
1 + t
2
− c. (A.30)
This condition is satisfied for all cost draws c1 ∈ [0, 1] as long as α ≤ 1/(1 + t). As in the case
of globally optimal policies, any foreign firm for which c2 ∈ [1− t, 1] cannot make any profit by
entering as its break even price is unity. Furthermore, no firm for c2 ∈ [0, 1− t] cannot be better
off by not entering as there is a positive probability that it will win the market. This completes
the proof of Proposition 2.
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Figure 7: Inefficiency for nationally optimal policies
As for the inefficiency probability, we proceed similarly as in Appendix A.1. Figure 7 also
shows the efficiency border as a broken line for t = 0.2. However, now the domestic firm is
the source of potential inefficiency. Setting (15) and (19) equal to each other, we get a critical
cˆ2 = 2c1 − (1 + t) which is given by the solid line. This line gives the costs for which both firms
charge the same prices, and hence the domestic firm wins if c2 is larger. This function is only
defined for c1 ∈ [(1+t)/2, 1]. The probability of inefficiency is given by the area below the broken
line minus the area below the solid line, corrected by 1/(1− t):
1
1− t
(
(1− t)2
2
− 1
2
(
1− 1 + t
2
)
(1− t)
)
=
(1− t)2
4
. (A.31)
34
Reference
Anderson, J. (1992). Domino dumping, i: competitive exporters. American Economic Review,
82, 65–83.
Bagwell, K. and Staiger, R. (1990). A theory of managed trade. American Economic Review,
80, 779–795.
Beshkar, M. and Bond, E. (2010). Transaction costs, asymmetric countries and flexible trade
agreements..
Blonigen, B. and Prusa, T. (2003). Antidumping. In Choi, E. K. and Harrigan, J. (Eds.),
Handbook of International Trade, pp. 251–284. Blackwell.
Bown, C. (2007). Global antidumping database. World Bank, Development Research Group,
Trade Team, Washington, D.C.
Brander, J. and Krugman, P. (1983). A ’reciprocal dumping’ model of international trade.
Journal of International Economics, 15, 313–321.
Broda, C. and Weinstein, D. E. (2006). Globalization and the gains from variety. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 121 (2), 541–585.
Chisik, R. (2003). Gradualism in free trade agreements: a theoretical justification. Journal of
International Economics, 59 (2), 367–397.
Creane, A. and Miyagiwa, K. (2008). Information and disclosure in strategic trade policy. Journal
of International Economics, 75 (1), 229–244.
Feenstra, R. (2004). Advanced International Trade. Theory and Evidence. Princeton University
Press.
Fischer, H. and Prusa, T. (2003). Wto exceptions as insurance. Review of International Eco-
nomics, 11, 745–757.
Hillberry, R. and McCalman, P. (2011). What triggers an anti-dumping petition? finding the
devil in the detail..
Horn, H. Maggi, G. and Staiger, R. (2010). Trade agreements as endogenously incomplete
contracts. American Economic Review, 100, 394–419.
Kolev, D. and Prusa, T. (2002). Dumping and double crossing: the (in)effectiveness of cost-based
trade policy under incomplete information. International Economic Review, 43, 895–918.
Krishna, V. (2002). Auction Theory. Academic Press.
Laffont, J.-J. and Tirole, J. (1988). The dynamics of incentive contracts. Econometrica: Journal
of the Econometric Society, 1153–1175.
Maggi, G. and Staiger, R. (2008). On the role and design of dispute settlement in international
trade agreements. Working paper 14067, NBER.
35
Maggi, G. and Staiger, R. (2009). Breach, remedies and dispute settlement in international trade
agreements. Working paper 15460, NBER.
Maggi, G. (1999). Strategic trade policy under incomplete information. International Economic
Review, 40 (3), 571–594.
Martin, A. and Vergote, W. (2008). On the role of retaliation in trade agreements. Journal of
International Economics, 76 (1), 61–77.
Matschke, X. and Schottner, A. (2008). Antidumping as strategic trade policy under asym-
metric information. Working papers 2008-19, University of Connecticut, Department of
Economics.
McAfee, R. P. and McMillan, J. (1989). Government procurement and international trade.
Journal of international economics, 26 (3), 291–308.
Miyagiwa, K. and Ohno, Y. (2007). Dumping as a signal of innovation. Journal of International
Economics, 71, 221–240.
Qui, L. D. (1994). Optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information. Journal of
International Economics, 36 (3), 333–354.
Spulber, D. F. (1995). Bertrand competition when rivals’ costs are unknown. The Journal of
Industrial Economics, 1–11.
Staiger, R. and Wolak, F. (1992). The effect of domestic antidumping law in the presence of
foreign monopoly. Journal of International Economics, 32, 265–287.
36
